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INTRODUCTION

As we celebrate the 200th anniversary of the abolition of the slave
trade, I want to examine some implications of what did not happen:
the lack of compensation to the slave traders and the non-response of
the law to the stopping of a global enterprise. This Essay will make
two points, which are unrelated: first, the lack of any reported cases
on claims of excuse for performance of contracts may indicate that we
do not need any doctrines of excuse; and second, that the lack of compensation paid to those whose business was outlawed, while 20 million
pounds was paid as compensation to the slave owners (because of abolition of slavery in 1832), indicates that there was no recognized
property right in an ongoing enterprise.'
Before entering into the body of my work, I want to discuss the
moral problems with writing about slavery. This Essay analyzes the
effects (or non-effects) of the abolition of slavery; but such an approach ignores the moral dimension and is, on a fundamental level,
wrong. Slavery was a crime against humanity and has to be seen on
those terms. The abolition of slavery, however, can be looked at from
the stance of the legal academic, and the products of research into
abolition and its effects can contribute to our understanding of legal
doctrine. There is nothing wrong with such an exercise if the writer
and reader realize that the problem with slavery and the slave trade
was not a matter of legal doctrine.
There is an example of the problematic approach to classifying the
slave trade while doing research at the Oak Park Public Library.
Books on the slave trade are classified there, by the Dewey Decimal
System, under "World Trade." Thus, books on the slave trade were
t B.A., University of California (Berkeley), 1964; M.A., University of California
(Irvine), 1967; J.D., University of Chicago, 1969. The Author wishes to thank his
research assistant, Michael Ohlman, for his assistance.
1. See An Act for the Abolition of Slavery Throughout the British Colonies, 3' h
40 Gulielmi iv, cap. LXXIII., http://www.pdavis.nl/Legis_07.htm.
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shelved next to those on the World Trade Organization and the North
American Free Trade Agreement. So was the slave trade commerce
or crime? It was both.
II.

ExcuSE FOR NON-PERFORMANCE

In present contract law, there is a set of related doctrines that involve an excuse of contractual performance where some event occurs
that the parties did not anticipate in their contract. 2 For the seller, the
doctrine is called "impossibility" (now often termed "impracticability"); for the buyer, "frustration of purpose." The idea behind the two
doctrines is that there has been a supervening turn of events that has
impeded the promisor's performance or defeated a party's purpose in
making the contract. Professor Farnsworth, in his casebook, describes
these cases:
Sections 2 and 3[of his casebook] feature obligations that are subverted by events occurring after the parties have contracted. When
a promisor gets relief on the ground that a supervening turn of
events has impeded its performance, the word "impossibility" ornow more commonly-the word "impracticability" is usually used
The typical situation presented in Section 3 is
in explanation ....
somewhat singular in that the party claiming an excuse cannot say
that its performance was impeded by a supervening event; rather,
some turn of events has thwarted that party's object in making the
contract. Usually the phrase "frustration of purpose" is used in this
connection.3
The topic has generated classic cases, which have been used by generations of law professors to bedevil and befuddle law students. Examples include Taylor v. Caldwell,4 in which the defendant music hall
owners were excused from their contract to let their facilities to a
group of musicians because the music hall had burned down; Transatlantic FinancingCorp. v. U.S.,5 in which a shipper claimed, but did not
get paid for, the extra distance traveled because of the closure of the
Suez Canal; and Krell v. Henry,6 where the defendant did not have to
pay the remaining balance under an agreement to rent a flat in order
to see the coronation parade of Edward VII (the coronation had been
postponed due to the King's illness). As we will see, the abolition of
the slave trade did not generate any such cases, although one would
think that the abolition of a global commerce would have.
2. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ET AL., Basic Assumptions: Mistake, Impracticabilityand Frustration,in CONTRACTS, Ch. 8 (6th ed. 2001).
3. Id. at 785.
4. See Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.).
5. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. U.S., 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
6. See Krell v. Henry, (1903) 2 K.B. 740 (Ct. of App.).
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A.

The Slave Trade

Around the time of the trade's abolition, the global commerce of
slavery and slave production was booming. "[T]he abolitionists were
facing a dynamic system." 7 The rate of profit on invested capital for
the slave trade was just under 10%, comparatively a high rate of return.8 The trade itself was one-fifth of Britain's overseas trade,' and
Britain accounted for half the world total of the slave trade in the
period between 1791 and 1806. "First, in terms of the usual standards,
the British trade was bigger and better over the period as a whole than
it had ever been." 10 Furthermore, there was an expanding market:
slavery was expanding into the bigger islands of the West Indies and
into the North American shores on the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi Valley."
B.

Abolition

The abolition of the trade in 1807 was preceded by acts which regulated the trade. In response, British slave traders started sailing under
neutral colors.1 2 The volume of slaves landing in the New World declined after 1803. British trade to foreign areas was abolished in
1806.13 But even though the trade figures were in decline, abolition
stopped the legal slave trade entirely.
This stopping of an entire sector of commerce did not cause any
private law response, nor any development of common law doctrine.
In recent history, upheavals in commerce have produced litigation by
those seeking to get out of contracts due to a change in circumstances.
The Suez Crisis in 1956 resulted in several cases (one of which has
been noted above) in which shipping companies and shippers tried to
readjust their contracts.14 The "energy crisis" of the early 1970s reenergy sellers and buyers sought to get
sulted in several cases where
15
out of long-term contracts.
Certainly the trade was not stopped completely; much of it was just
carried on illegally. According to Hugh Thomas, "the United States
7. SEYMOUR DRESCHER, ECONCIDE, BRITISH SLAVERY IN THE ERA OF ABOLI-

165 (1997).
8. See id. at 30 (examining the profitability of the British slave trade).
9. See id. at 165 (analyzing the abolitionists' fears that the British slave trade
would increase with capitalism).
10. Id. at 75.
11. See id. at 98 (discussing the increasing geographic reach of the slave trade).
12. See id. at 30 (explaining why British slave ships sailed under neutral colors).
13. Id. at 29.
14. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. U.S., 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
15. See, e.g., E. Airlines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 433-35 (S.D. Fla.
1975); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981);
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 58-59 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
TION
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enjoyed a modest illegal international trade in slaves for fifty years."16
The same English traders continued to operate and some sailed under
foreign flags. 7 Moreover, trading firms invested in Spanish or Portuguese ships.1 8
There were monetary penalties for engaging in the illegal trade, but
not criminal ones. Ships involved in the trade were liable to be seized
and condemned. "The master and owner were liable to be fined £100
per slave and the ships and goods forfeited to the Crown."1 9
C. The Legal Non-Reaction
The lack of legal response to the outlawing of the slave trade may
help us better understand the law of the impracticability and frustration of purpose cases. Professor Andrew Kull argues that the "true
rule" here, as judged by a wide range of cases, "is to confirm the parties in status quo, granting relief to neither."2 0 Professor Kull maintains that the loss in these cases should be where it falls: "No set of
judicially imposed default rules can usefully allocate unidentified
risks; nor can judges do anything to optimize risk by spreading by
their ex-post reallocation of losses."2 1
This Essay argues that one can look at abolition of the slave trade
as a gigantic experiment in which a global commercial activity was
shut down. Yet, there was no litigation claiming excuse. Abolition
did not create any new legal doctrine. The development of these legal
concepts of excuse lay in the future, with Taylor v. Caldwell in 1863,
which imported the civil law concept that a party "is freed from his
obligation when the thing has perished, neither by his act, nor his neglect, and before he is in default."2 2
William W. Story's A Treatise on the Law of Contracts Not Under
Seal2 3 does not cite any slave cases under the section dealing with
excuse. Langdell's A Summary of the Law of Contracts (1880) does
not mention any cases involving the slave trade. So it would seem that
Professor Kull is right-a business was able to be closed down and
those participating in the trade could adjust, without the assistance of
any doctrine of excuse. Thus, the "thing that did not happen"-the
16.

HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADEF/THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE

1440-1870, 568 (1977).
17. Id. at 572.
18. Id.
19. The National Archives, British Transatlantic Slave Trade: Abolition, http:II
www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/RdLeaflet.asp?sLeafletID=409 (last visited
Apr. 7, 2008).
20. Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration,and the Windfall Principle and Contract
Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 54 (1991-1992). Author's full disclosure: Prof. Kull is
my wife's college roommate's husband's step-brother.
21. Id. at 55.
22. Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 313 (Q.B.).
23. WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT UNDER
SEAL (3rd. ed. 1874).

TRADE

HeinOnline -- 14 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 292 2007-2008

2008]

NO COMPENSATION FOR SLAVE TRADERS

293

non-development of any doctrine of excuse-supports his position
that such a doctrine is unnecessary.
III.

NON-COMPENSATION

The second point of this Essay discusses the significance of the fact
the slave traders did not receive any compensation for the termination
of their business, while twenty-three years later, the slave owners did.
Although I have not found any historical record of even a suggestion that slave traders should be compensated, there was social consensus that the slave owners should be compensated for the loss of
their property. Professor Kathleen May Butler states that "most government officials, and indeed many abolitionists, believed that uncompensated emancipation would be unconstitutional and would set a
dangerous precedent .. ."24 Professors Fogel and Engerman describe
the deeply rooted conviction that the slave owner's property rights in
slaves had to be respected, both in the case of Great Britain and in the
Northern States that abolished slavery before the Civil War:
These, of course, were not the only factors that influenced the timing or the content of British legislation on emancipation. Parliamentary action was no doubt also influenced by such matters as the
rising concern over the condition of the English industrial classes,
especially the children and women employed in the factories and
mines. However, we believe that the factors we have singled out
are relevant to an explanation not only of what was common to the
British and northern cases, but also to certain important differences
regarding the distribution of the financial burden of emancipation.
What was common to the two cases, of course, was agreement
that the title of slaveholders to their chattels was a valid property
right that had to be respected. There were some Britons who held
that the claims of slaves to their freedom represented a higher morality than the claims of owners of property. But they were a small
minority among the British public and were virtually without voice
in Parliament. The merchants, lawyers, manufacturers, and landowners who dominated the antislavery bloc within Parliament
showed no desire to bring into question so fundamental a tenet of
their own social order. Forced emancipation, of course, even with
full compensation to slaveholders, represented some degree of tampering with property rights. But taxes and governmental regulation
of commerce were also intrusions. And so the parliamentary struggle for emancipation was generally confined to proposals that involved only degrees of interference consistent with the prevailing
practices. This viewpoint was so widely accepted and deeply held
that the proslavery bloc continually invoked the specter of an attack
24. KATHLEEN MARY BUTLER, THE ECONOMICS OF EMANCIPATION, JAMAICA]
BARBADOS, 1823-1843, xvi (1995).
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on property rights to stave off legislation that moved in the direction of emancipation.25
In the case of the slave traders, there was no such social norm, consensus, or fundamental tenet. The ending of the slave economy
("econcide," as it was called by Seymour Drescher)26 called for no
compensation either for the destruction in value of the ships, insofar
as they were adopted to the slave trade, or for the ending of the extra
profit to be made in the trade.
The meaning of the Takings Clause ("Nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation"2 7 ) of the Fifth
Amendment is a matter of current concern. (See, for example, the
wide, frequently hostile reaction to the Court's ruling that taking for a
public purpose includes condemnation for a private shopping
center.28 ) The total lack of compensation given to the slave traders, in
contrast to the great sum given later to the slave owners, tells us something of the meaning of the clause.
In the half-century following the adoption of the Takings Clause,
property was seen as something tangible (here, the human beings
owned as slaves) and not the economic profit enjoyed by a business or
the property rights in a going business.
Professor Frank Snyder suggested that this differing view was classbased: the rights of landowners, who were the aristocracy or gentry,
deserved protection, but the rights of the middle class in their business
profits and trades did not.
Whatever the reason, one type of economic good was protected and
another not. This non-protection argues against Richard Epstein's position in his book, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain.2 9

In Takings, Professor Epstein argues that any governmental deprivation of an individual's property rights, broadly conceived (in fact
"property" is defined by him to the maximum extreme), is a "taking"
which should be compensated. This would include any hindrance of
the right of disposition: "Let the state impose restrictions or conditions upon the right of disposition, let it block or hinder sale or lease
or mortgage, then it too has taken property for which compensation is
prima facie required."3 Thus, Epstein would see the restriction on
the right of the slave trader to sell his slaves to be a taking.
25. Robert William Fogel & Stanley L. Engerman, Philanthropyat BargainPrices:

Notes on the Economics of Gradual Emancipation,3 J.
26. DRESCHER, supra note 7.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

LEGAL STUD.

377, 383 (1974).

28. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that
the city's exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of economic development
plan satisfied constitutional "public use" requirement).
29. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
30. Id. at 74-75.
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Moreover, such a restriction also "takes" the rights of the purchaser. "Any restriction that in form restricts only disposition by the
owner perforce limits rights of others to acquire property in exchange
for their cash, property, and perhaps labor. The Takings Clause
reaches both the buyer and the seller, not just the seller."3 1
Later in his book, Epstein goes from analyzing a taking from an
individual to takings from many individuals by "taxation, regulation,
and modifications of liability rules."3 2 These mass takings, he concludes, "are amenable to the same form of analysis as garden-variety
takings of land; they cannot be kept in a watertight compartment separate from takings of private property."3 3 Thus, regulation is a taking:
"Regulations limit the goods that can be sold in commerce and the
prices charged for them .... Yet these pro-tem forms of regulation all
amount to partial takings of private policy."34
To be fair, Epstein does say that "[s]lavery by conquest is regarded
as a categorical evil," although he then appends a footnote stating,
"The question of slavery by contract is far more difficult ...
Because slavery is (or is regarded as) a categorical evil, presumably the
slave trade and slave ownership could be banned.
But in giving compensation, the early nineteenth-century British
and Americans distinguished between two types of economic rights,
both seen to be evil-the slave trade and slave ownership. Engaging
in the slave trade was just not seen as property, while owning slaves
was.
This view of property was roughly contemporary with the drafting
of the Takings Clause in the United States Constitution; and so Epstein's argument is completely ahistorical. As such, his argument contradicts that of another conservative legal thinker, Justice Antonin
Scalia, who claims that interpreting the Constitution by the original
intent of the drafters and following the judicial interpretation contemporary with the drafting is the only valid approach.3 6 Epstein and
Scalia, both known as conservatives, cannot both be right.
IV.

CONCLUSION

So this Essay ends negatively, stating that there is a historical argument or at least a negative inference from history. This Essay argues
that two legal doctrines, one a secure part of contract doctrine and
one a proposed interpretation of constitutional law, lack validity. It
31. Id. at 75.
32. Id. at 93.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 101.
35. Id. at 335.
36. See generally Allen R. Kamp, The Counter-Revolutionary Nature of Justice
Scalia's Traditionalism, 27 Pac. L.J. 99 (1995-1996) (investigating Justice Scalia's
traditionalism).
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seems that if we once did without impracticability and frustration, we
could do without them now. Professor Epstein may have a sound policy basis (actually, I think his proposal would lead to disaster) for his
theory of takings, but his vision has no historical basis. The abolition
of the slave trade, a victory for civilization, also contributes a little to
the study of legal doctrine.
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